Abstract. Shape-memory alloys are metal pieces that "remember" their original cold-forged shapes and return to the pre-deformed shape after heating. In this work we construct a software analogous of shape-memory alloys: programs whose code resists obfuscation. We show how to pour arbitrary functions into protective envelops that allow recovering the functions' exact initial code after obfuscation. We explicit the theoretical foundations of our method and provide a concrete implementation in Scheme.
Introduction
Biological forms of life have a major advantage over machines: the capacity to heal. [4] denes self-healing as "the property that enables a system to perceive that it is not operating correctly and, without human intervention, make the necessary adjustments to restore itself to normalcy". In 3.8 billions of years, natural selection managed to develop outstanding self-healing mechanisms. Living organisms embed biological information in their dnas. This information and the "defective automaton" represented by a damaged organism manage to heal when damage is not too extreme.
Over the last 50 years considerable eorts were invested in the design of errorcorrecting codes. Error-correcting codes make it possible to "heal" damaged data with the help of an error-free external decoder. Informally, self-healing systems manage to x errors even when the decoder's algorithm is somewhat damaged.
In this work we study the design of executable code that resists obfuscation.
Our goal is to construct programs that recover their exact initial code after obfuscation. In a way, our concept is analogous to shape-memory alloys that "remember" their original cold-forged shapes and return to the pre-deformed shape by heating.
Throughout this paper we will follow the code is data notational principle and represent functions F by the s-expression which is used to dene them 3 . 
Denoting by F the set of all functions which can be represented by an sexpression, real-life obfuscators usually attempt to transform F ∈ F into an O(F) ∈ F which is harder to reverse-engineer. Bibliography about the usefulness of obfuscators abounds. We refer the reader to the introductory section of [1] for further reference.
In 2009, Barak et al. [1] exhibited a family of unobfuscatable functions F. Barak et al. formalized unobfuscatability by requiring that there exists a property π : F → {true, false} such that given any program that computes a function F ∈ F, the value π(F) can be eciently computed, while given oracle access to a randomly selected F ∈ F, no ecient algorithm can compute π(F) signicantly better than random guessing.
We start by observing that given any "real-life" (i.e. commercial) obfuscator, the construction of inherently unobfuscatable code is easy: A Quine (named after the logician Willard Van Orman Quine) is an unobfuscatable program 5 that prints its own code [2, 5] .
Writing Quines is a somewhat tricky programming exercise yielding Lisp, C or natural language examples such as:
((lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x))) (quote (lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x))))) char *f="char*f=%c%s%c;main(){printf(f,34,f,34,10);}%c"; main() {printf(f,34,f,34,10);} Copy the next sentence twice. Copy the next sentence twice.
A Quine Q is impossible to obfuscate because either the evaluation of O(Q) yields Q and hence reveals the original pre-obfuscation code (thereby making 3 i.e. Whenever we write that a function is taken as argument or returned by another function, we really mean that s-expressions are taken and returned. Note that instead of s-expressions, one could use λ-terms or any form of source code. 4 We write F(x) = ⊥ if F(x) does not terminate. 5 Any Turing-complete formal system admits Quines [3] . obfuscation impossible) or it does not in which case O is not a valid obfuscator because then we would have that
This gives hope to construct in a somewhat generic manner unobfuscatable versions of arbitrary functions. Namely, if we could design a "Genetically Modied Organism" hybridizing a Quine Q and an arbitrary function F, then one may reasonably hope that the resulting version of F will inherit the obfuscationresistance features of the Quine while still performing the calculations that F encodes. This is the question dealt with by the present paper.
3
The Construction
Consider the function W such that for all functions F ∈ F and all inputs x : 
to prevent us from recovering the original F. However, we would still like O to return a function which is equivalent to the original F.
Let us dene formally what we mean by equivalent in the previous sentence:
We write
if F and F are the exact same s-expressions (i.e. the same executable code).
We write F = 1 F if F and F have an equivalent behavior i.e.
∀x, F(x) = F (x)
For all n > 1, we dene
with ⊥ = n x i x = 0 ⊥.
We extend the notation to arbitrary values (not necessarily programs):
x = n y ⇔ x = y and to tuples:
Now, instead of requiring that O(F) = 1 F for all x, we x some constant n and require that O(F) = n F.
Is it possible to build unobfuscatable programs under the above denition?
While intricate, the answer turns out to be positive, for any n.
To do so, we dene the function C such that ∀F ∈ F and for all inputs x:
Note that this requires C(F) to reference its own source code, which can be done by a Quine-like construction similar to the one used in Pastis [6] and which is justied theoretically by Kleene's second recursion theorem.
We claim that C(F) cannot be obfuscated in a way respecting the above constraints, no matter one's choice of n.
Indeed, given an obfuscated version O(C(F)) = n C(F), we can invoke
and obtain a function which is = n−1 C(F). We execute this "peeling process" n times and end up with a function which is = 0 C(F), i.e. the original C(F), from which F can be retrieved. We denote by D n a function implementing this "peeling process". In summary ∀n, there exists two functions C and D n such that ∀F ∈ F, for any obfuscator O verifying O(F ) = n F for all F , we have:
(O(C(F)))(false, x) = n F(x) and D n (O(C(F))) = F by the original C(F).
Finally, get-original-code extracts F from C(F).
In other words, the defender and the attacker (obfuscator) perform the following sequence of operations:
Further Research A very interesting challenge would be to design nontrivial functionality-preserving 8 programs and obfuscators. Letting π be a nontrivial property π : F → {true, false}, we dene Oπ as a functionality-preserving obfuscator with respect to property π if π(Oπ(F)) = π(F).
For instance, a functionality-preserving Quine would be a code Q such that Oπ(Q) prints Oπ(Q). In this example, the property π(F) is the answer to the question "Is F a Quine?" (instead of the question "Is F a specic Quine?").
Functionality-preserving obfuscation generalizes classical (function-preserving) obfuscation because in a classical obfuscator, π attempts to answer a question relating to the mathematical function F (encoded in the program F) and not to the actual code of F (that computes F ).
